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The Parties to the Nauru Agreement’s Vessel 
Day Scheme: 
Accounting for the Rare Success of an 
International Agreement 
 




International negotiations are notorious for their inability to reach 
agreements.  If an agreement is reached, there are usually serious 
problems with the strength of the deal, defectors, and failure of 
implementation.  The Vessel Day Scheme between the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (PNA), eight Pacific Island nations, is a modern 
example of a seemingly successful international agreement that 
addresses the overexploitation of the Pacific Island tuna fishery.  The 
Vessel Day Scheme is increasing revenue to its parties through 
licensing fees, decreasing catch to ensure the continued existence of 
the tuna fishery, and leveraging the PNA to be a stronger 
international negotiator than the parties would be individually.  
Considering that many international agreements either fall through, 
are not ratified by important parties, do not achieve their goals in 
practice, do not beneficially affect the target resource because of 
loopholes or non-compliance, or suffer from other crippling 
problems, the PNA’s experience seems unique.  This Article 
identifies and analyzes the factors that enable the PNA to experience 
success at a time when many other international agreements are 
weak, stalled, or are not implemented or enforced in practice.   
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THE PARTIES TO THE NAURU AGREEMENT’S 
VESSEL DAY SCHEME: 
ACCOUNTING FOR THE RARE SUCCESS OF AN 
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT 
 




The Pacific Islands region is home to one of the largest tuna 
fisheries in the world.1 Many people in the Pacific Islands depend on 
the tuna fisheries for their subsistence lifestyles and as a source of 
revenue, as many Pacific Island nations do not have any other 
significant natural resources due to their small landmasses.2 It is 
well-known that the world’s tuna fisheries have been overexploited 
for decades, leading many to fear the collapse of this valuable 
resource. The Pacific Islands tuna fishery is no exception. An 
unfortunate conundrum for Pacific Island nations is that while they 
depend on the continued existence of the fishery, their tuna-fishing 
fleets are not as industrialized or extensive as those of other fishing 
nations so, historically, they would not be able to compete with 
industrialized fishing nations even if they wanted to do so.3 Left 
unaddressed, this implies that a Pacific Island nation’s best option for 
raising revenue for itself is to sell permits that would allow distant 
water fishing nations to fish in the Pacific Island nation’s waters. 
Because the tuna fishery can be accessed from the waters of many 
different Pacific Island nations, industrialized fishing countries have 
the incentive to see which country would offer the lowest permit 
price, essentially bidding down the cost of a fishing permit. 
Unsurprisingly, this is exactly what happened in the Pacific Islands 
                                                
1 Margo Deiye, Making the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) Work, THE U.N. UNIV., 
FISHERIES TRAINING PROGRAMME 6, 10-11 (2007). 
2 Id. at 20-21; Robert Gillett, A Short History of Industrial Fishing in the Pacific 
Islands, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE U.N.  1 (2007), available at  
ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ai001e/ai001e00.pdf. 
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for many years.  
In 1982, certain Pacific Island countries signed and ratified 
the Nauru Agreement, which declared a broad goal of harmonizing 
the fisheries management policies of the signatory nations.4 These 
parties became known as the Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
(“PNA”). In 1995, the PNA executed the Palau Agreement, which 
originally limited the number of ships that could fish in the PNA’s 
waters but was amended in 2007 to adopt instead the Vessel Day 
Scheme agreement.5 The Vessel Day Scheme controls tuna landings 
in the PNA’s waters by limiting the number of fishing day licenses 
that may be sold by each party.6 Under the scheme, licenses must be 
sold for at least the designated minimum price to ensure increased 
revenue for the PNA.7 The minimum price also prevents distant 
water fishing nations from pitting the PNA against each other to see 
which country will sell fishing licenses for the lowest price. The 
Vessel Day Scheme seems to be a successful international 
agreement, as it is reported to be legitimately reaching its goals of 
increasing revenue to its parties through licensing fees, decreasing 
catch to ensure the continued existence of the tuna fishery, and 
leveraging the PNA to be a stronger international negotiator than the 
parties would be individually. 
Considering that many attempts at international negotiations 
do not meet with the same success as the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme, 
this Article identifies and analyzes factors that may help explain why 
the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme is successful. This Article concludes 
that factors may include the small number of parties involved in the 
negotiation of the agreement, the similar development and economic 
statuses of the parties, the parties’ similar interests and goals to reach 
through the agreement, and the fact that these parties have worked 
together as a coalition in negotiating an earlier notable tuna treaty. 
                                                
4 Nauru Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of 
Common Interest, art. I, Feb. 11, 1982 [hereinafter Nauru Agreement].  
5 Palau Arrangement for the Management of the Western Pacific Fishery as 
Amended – Management Scheme (Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme), amended 
Apr. 27. 2012 [hereinafter Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme]. 
6 Id. at art. 12. 
7 Resolution on Renewed Commitment to Cooperation in Fisheries Management 
and Development, PNA Resolution 01-2013, Mar. 1, 2013 [hereinafter Resolution 




107  CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Vol. XII 
 
 
The conclusions made in this Article are limited, but they offer 
insight into the success of the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme agreement. 
These ideas shed light on how other groups of small, developing 
countries can join together to solve collective action problems, 
increase their international negotiating power, and protect natural 
resources on which they depend. 
 
I. Background – The Pacific Island Tuna Fisheries and 
the Actions of the Parties to the Nauru Agreement 
 
A. A Snapshot of the Region and Resources at Stake 
 
The Pacific Islands region is located in the western and 
central parts of the Pacific Ocean and consists of twenty-two 
countries and territories.8 Because many of these countries and 
territories have very small landmasses, most of the area that they 
manage is ocean within their Exclusive Economic Zones (“EEZs”).9 
EEZs extend 200 nautical miles from each country’s shoreline.10 An 
extreme example of this is Kiribati, which has a land-to-sea ratio of 
1:5,000.11 The islands are also spread far enough apart that most of 
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean falls within the Pacific Island 
states’ EEZs.12 Because of this water-based geography, marine 
resources are very important to the economies and survival of the 
nine million Pacific Island people.13 Many of the Pacific Islands are 
considered developing nations.14 
The tuna fisheries in this region account for approximately 
half of the world’s annual tuna catch.15 Tuna are highly migratory 
species and travel longer distances than any other fish, usually 
                                                
8 Gillett, supra note 2, at 1. 
9 Id. 
10 Pepe Clarke, Management of Tuna Fisheries in the Western and Central Pacific, 
INT’L UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE, available at 
https://portals.iucn.org/library/efiles/html/EPLP-072/section11.html#fn1 (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id.; Gillett, supra note 1, at 1. 
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thousands of miles, to feed and spawn.16 This characteristic makes 
them difficult to manage and preserve because it prevents local, 
national, or patchwork legal frameworks from imposing improved 
management practices over the tuna’s entire range. Once caught, 
tuna is a very valuable product and is sold primarily for canning and 
sashimi.17 Distant water fishing fleets, hailing from countries such as 
the United States, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, catch most of the 
tuna in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean.18  
Tuna has been described as the Pacific Islands’ most valuable 
resource.19 Because of the high market value for tuna, careful 
management and conservation of Pacific tuna populations is essential 
for maximizing economic benefits for Pacific Island people and 
development in the region. Small-scale fishing is essential to local 
Pacific Island subsistence economies, but industrial-level fishing 
may have great potential to support economic development in the 
region.20  Industrial tuna fisheries in the Pacific Islands are worth 
more than seven times the other Pacific Island fisheries combined.21 
Traditionally, the distant water fishing nations realize most of 
the benefits from tuna fishing in the Western and Central Pacific 
Ocean because they catch most of the tuna and host most of the 
canning facilities.22 However, in recent years, some of the Pacific 
Island states have joined together to recapture the value of tuna from 
within and outside of their EEZs by expanding their processing 
industry, creating and expanding domestic industrial fishing fleets, 
and jointly managing tuna stocks. This Article focuses on agreements 
                                                
16 Biological Characteristics of Tuna, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N.: FISHERIES & 
AQUACULTURE DEP’T, available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/16082/en (last 
visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
17 Tuna Resources, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N.: FISHERIES & AQUACULTURE DEP’T, 
available at http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/12251/en (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
18 Clarke, supra note 10. 
19 Id. 
20 Id.  “Industrial fishing” is generally understood to mean offshore fishing in large 
vessels.  Gillett, supra note 2, at 2. 
21 Gillett, supra note 2, at 2. 
22 Clarke, supra note 10 (“Historically, about 90 per cent of the total tuna catch in 
the Western and Central Pacific has been harvested by four distant-water fishing 
nations: Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and the United States of America.”); see also 
Gillett, supra note 2, at 10 (noting failed Pacific Island canneries and “stiff 
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created by Pacific Island countries to manage and protect tuna stocks 
that are fished within and between the countries’ EEZs. 
 
B. The Beginning – The Forum Fisheries Agency and the 
Nauru Agreement 
 
During the process to sign and ratify the Third United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”), the 
international treaty that established EEZs, seventeen Pacific Island 
states executed the South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency 
Convention (“SPFFAC”), which entered into force on August 9, 
1979.23 The SPFFAC established the Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries 
Agency (“FFA”) to help Pacific Island states sustainably manage the 
fishery resources in their EEZs to improve economic and social well-
being.24 The FFA is a central source of expertise, technology, and 
information gathering and disseminating for the member states.25 It 
focuses mainly on economic and legal issues rather than scientific or 
biological issues.26 Unlike other international fisheries management 
organizations, the FFA was created specifically for the benefit of the 
Pacific Island states and excluded distant water fishing nations.27 
Amidst the hype of UNCLOS, the SPFFAC created a unified voice 
among the Pacific Island states that sent a strong message that these 
states intended to “enforce their sovereign rights over the marine 
                                                
23 South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, July 10, 1979; FFA 
Members, PAC. ISLANDS F. FISHERIES AGENCY, available at 
http://www.ffa.int/members (last visited Apr. 14, 2014); Regional Fishery Bodies 
Summary Descriptions: Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA), FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. 
U.N.: FISHERIES & AQUACULTURE DEP’T, http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/ffa/en 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
24 South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, supra note 23, at art. I; Lisa 
K. Bostwick, Empowering South Pacific Fishmongers: A New Framework for 
Preferential Access Agreements in the South Pacific Tuna Industry, 26 L. & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 897, 901 (1995). 
25 South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, supra note 23, at art. VII. 
26 Bostwick, supra note 24, at 901. 
27 Id. Rising tensions at UNCLOS due to the United States’ refusal to recognize 
Pacific Island states’ jurisdiction over tuna was a factor in the formation of the 
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resources, i.e. tuna, in their respective EEZs.”28 
Certain parties to the SPFFAC—the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New 
Guinea, and the Solomon Islands—went further to ensure economic 
benefits to their countries through their sovereign management rights 
over their EEZs. In 1982, they executed the Nauru Agreement 
Concerning Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries of Common 
Interest (“Nauru Agreement”).29 The Nauru Agreement declared a 
broad and vague goal of harmonizing the management of fisheries in 
the parties’ EEZs without specific implementation measures.30 The 
Nauru Agreement required the parties to eventually create a licensing 
and fee scheme for foreign vessels seeking to fish in the parties’ 
EEZs.31 These parties, which now include Tuvalu, are known as the 
Parties to the Nauru Agreement (“PNA”). 
 
C. Implementation – the Palau Agreement and the Vessel 
Day Scheme 
 
Even though the PNA includes only eight of the Pacific 
Island states, their EEZs encompass a significant tuna fishery that 
covers 14.8 million square kilometers.32 According to the PNA, 
twenty-five percent  of the world’s tuna stocks and fifty percent of 
the global stock of skipjack live in PNA waters.33  
Maximizing the flow of economic benefits from the tuna 
fisheries to the PNA states and their citizens continues to be a 
concern for the PNA.34 This is especially crucial for the PNA states, 
                                                
28 Kathleen M. Burch, Due Process in Micronesia: Are Fish Due Less Process?, 8 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 43, 53 (2002). 
29 Nauru Agreement, supra note 4. Tuvalu is also now a party to this agreement.  
See Pacifical, PACIFICAL, http://pacifical.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 14, 
2014). 
30 Id. at art I. 
31 Id. at art. II. 
32 The 8 PNA Countries = 25% of the World Tuna Catch, PACIFICAL, 
http://pacifical.com/the_pna_countries.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
33 Id.; About Us, PARTIES TO THE NAURU AGREEMENT, 
http://www.pnatuna.com/About-Us (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). Skipjack is the 
most commonly canned tuna.  About Us, supra. 
34 The Pacifical People, PACIFICAL, http://pacifical.com/people.html (last visited 
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which are still considered developing countries and estimate that 
only eleven percent of the profits from tuna caught in PNA waters 
return to the people of the PNA.35 
To better manage their valuable fisheries and implement the 
goals of the Nauru Agreement, the PNA needed an agreement with 
specific implementation measures. The Palau Agreement for the 
Management of the Western Pacific Fishery (“Palau Agreement”),36 
adopted in 1995, originally limited the number of purse seine vessels 
that were allowed to fish in PNA EEZs.37 Purse seine vessels are 
commercial fishing ships that encircle entire schools of fish, enabling 
consistent, efficient, and large catches.38 Because of the large impact 
of purse seine vessels, limiting their numbers would in theory help 
protect the tuna fisheries from overfishing. The original Palau 
Agreement management scheme was replaced in December 2007 by 
the Vessel Day Scheme, an amendment to the Palau Agreement.39  
The Vessel Day Scheme caps the total number of days of purse seine 
fishing in the parties’ combined EEZs and allocates fishing day 
licenses to parties based on historical catches.40 The parties may then 
sell the licenses to foreign fishing fleets or other PNA countries and 
allocate the necessary number of licenses to domestic fisheries.41 The 
broad goals of the Vessel Day Scheme are to (1) maximize the 
PNA’s rate of return from tuna fishing in their waters and (2) reduce 
tuna catches to sustainable levels.42 
Setting up a licensing and fee scheme for any vessel fishing 
in PNA waters ensured that at least some money would flow back to 
the PNA from foreign fishing fleets that wanted to fish in the PNA’s 
tuna-rich EEZs. However, without a minimum fee, foreign fleets 
could pit the PNA against each other to determine which country 
                                                
35 Id. 
36 Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme, supra note 5. 
37 Id. at art. 1; Deiye, supra note 1, at 13.  
38 Purse Seine, INT’L SEAFOOD SUSTAINABILITY FOUND., http://iss-
foundation.org/purse-seine/ (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
39 Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme, supra note 5. 
40 Id. at art. 12; Deiye, supra note 28, at 5, 13. 
41 Deiye, supra note 28, at 22. 
42 Id. at 13; Vessel Day Scheme: Introduction, PAC. ISLANDS F. FISHERIES AGENCY, 
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would offer the lowest fee to fish in its EEZ.43 This disadvantaged 
the PNA because they were forced to either accept low offers from 
foreign fleets in exchange for access to their high value marine 
resources or risk receiving no revenue. The revenue that the PNA 
countries received for access to their EEZs was lower than if they 
gathered collectively to set a baseline minimum fee to leverage 
themselves against the foreign fleets.  
In 2011, the parties set a minimum price for fishing day 
licenses sold under their Vessel Day Scheme.44 This move altered the 
power dynamic between the PNA and distant water fishing nations 
by preventing foreign fleets from pitting the PNA against each other 
to see which country would offer the lowest license price in 
exchange for the foreign fleet’s business. Currently, license fees cost 
$6,000 for one vessel for one day of purse seine fishing.45 Vessels 
under fifty meters long count for a half day of fishing, a fifty to 
eighty meter vessel counts for a full day, and any vessel over eighty 
meters counts for one and a half fishing days.46 The Vessel Day 
Scheme has characteristics similar to a cap and trade scheme, as the 
total allowable fishing days are capped, the days are distributed to 
the parties, and PNA countries can transfer their fishing days to other 
PNA participants.  
The Vessel Day Scheme differs from other fisheries 
management schemes in that the licenses limit the number of fishing 
days rather than set catch limits. To ensure that licensees do not 
increase their daily catch ability over time, the PNA are briefed at 
their annual meetings on “observed or potential increase in average 
effective fishing effort for each fishing day[,]” called “effort creep” 
in the agreement.47 The Palau Agreement requires that the parties 
                                                
43 This problem was recognized in a 2013 Memorandum of Understanding between 
PNA members. Memorandum of Understanding Between the Parties to the Palau 
Agreement on Minimum Bench Mark Fee for a Fishing Day Under the Vessel Day 
Scheme, Mar. 1, 2013 [hereinafter Bench Mark Fee Memorandum] (“…[T]he 
Parties are desirous of establishing a minimum bench mark fee for a fishing day 
under the Vessel Day Scheme for foreign fishing fleets to avoid these fleets 
undermining the Parties efforts by playing them off against each other.”). 
44 Resolution on Renewed Commitment, supra note 7. 
45 Id.; Bench Mark Fee Memorandum, supra note 43.  
46 Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme, supra note 5, at art. 6.1iv-vi. 
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take any measure necessary “to ensure such effort creep is not 
detrimental to the fishery.”48 Although it may seem odd that an 
agreement that aims to reduce catch measures effort in units of 
fishing days rather than catch, it is likely easier to measure and 
enforce fishing days. 
The Palau Agreement’s Implementing Arrangements 
establish minimum terms and conditions for fishing in waters 
controlled by the PNA. They require fishing vessels licensed under 
the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme to have an Automatic Location 
Communicator in order to monitor the vessel’s location, speed, and 
course.49 The most recent arrangement introduced catch retention 
measures to prevent lower value tuna from being excessively 
dumped overboard.50 It also banned purse seine fishing vessels from 
using fish aggregating devices (“FADs”) between July 1 and 
September 30.51 FADs can problematic for fisheries management 
because they increase catch.52 The most recent arrangement also 
prohibits PNA-licensed fishing vessels from fishing in international 
waters between PNA EEZs and within certain coordinates.53  This 
unique development, discussed in-depth in Part I.D., gives the PNA 
some control over international waters, or the “high seas,” even 
though the PNA does not have jurisdiction over those waters.  
 
D. Reaching Beyond National Management Boundaries 
– Regulating the High Seas 
 
The PNA crafted a unique development to attempt to mitigate 
                                                
48 Id. 
49 A Second Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth 
Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties, 
art. II, Sept. 19, 1990. 
50 A Third Arrangement Implementing the Nauru Agreement Setting Forth 
Additional Terms and Conditions of Access to the Fisheries Zones of the Parties, 
art. I(1), May 16, 2008 (amended Sept. 11, 2010) [hereinafter Third Implementing 
Arrangement]. 
51 Id. at art. I(2). 
52 See Fish Aggregating Device, FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. U.N.: FISHERIES & 
AQUACULTURE, http://www.fao.org/fishery/equipment/fad/en (last visited Apr. 14, 
2014). 
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the problem of the migratory character of tuna and the lack of 
jurisdiction on the high seas. Because tuna are highly migratory and 
move between many different boundaries, the PNA were concerned 
that their efforts to foster a steady tuna population by limiting catch 
days in their EEZs would be undermined by unregulated fishing on 
the high seas.54 In 2007, the PNA brought their concerns to the 
Western and Central Pacific Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
Commission (“WCPFC”), a regional fisheries management 
organization that includes distant water fishing states like the United 
States and Japan.55 Unfortunately, the WCPFC could not make a 
decision on how to regulate fishing on the high seas.56  
The PNA decided to act on its own. As a condition of the 
PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme license, PNA-licensed ships were not 
allowed to fish in the high seas pockets between the PNA EEZs.57 
Thus, a ship could either be licensed by the PNA to fish in an EEZ 
and agree to not fish the high seas, or not seek a license and be 
allowed to fish in the high seas but not any EEZs. This latter choice 
is economically difficult because “the majority of the main purse-
seine fishing grounds in the Western and Central Pacific” are located 
in an EEZ that belongs to the PNA.58 This collective action by the 
PNA influenced action by the WCPFC, and the next year, the 
WCPFC adopted a compatible measure.59  
 
E. Going Forward – Relying on Collective Action 
 
The Vessel Day Scheme relies on compliance by all parties 
with regards to the price set for licenses and the number of licenses 
sold. If some Vessel Day Scheme licenses were not sold due to low 
demand, parties would have an incentive to defect from the 
agreement by offering their licenses for a lower price. If one party 
was to break the scheme and offer fishing day licenses at a lower 
                                                
54 Tim Adams, Pacific Island Tuna Fisheries: New Bold Steps, 58 TUNA FISHERIES 
22, 23 (2011). 
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price, foreign fishing fleets would presumably gravitate towards 
buying licenses from that party. This would decrease revenue 
brought to other PNA countries through the Vessel Day Scheme 
while increasing revenue for the one defector party.  
Similarly, if all the available licenses were sold, parties 
would have an incentive to sell more licenses than they have been 
allocated under the Vessel Day Scheme. Selling more than the 
allocated number of licenses would fulfill one of the PNA’s goals, to 
increase parties’ economic gain from their fisheries, but would 
undermine the PNA’s goal of ensuring the tuna’s continued existence 
so that it can continue to be a source of profit in the future. A small 
number of licenses sold beyond the cap would likely not destroy the 
entire fishery. However, defectors can start the trend that makes the 
agreements irrelevant by undermining the scheme’s legitimacy and 
the protective purpose of the agreements.  
The Vessel Day Scheme has already experienced one 
defector. One party “significantly exceeded its Party Allowable 
Effort (PAE),” or the number of licenses that was allocated to that 
party.60 The other parties agreed to not penalize that party “on the 
basis of that Party’s assurance that the [Vessel Day Scheme] will be 
fully implemented in 2013 and beyond.”61 The details of this defect 
are unclear. However, it is clear that the PNA took measures to reign 
in the defector and intend to continue with their collective agreement 
despite the occurrence of a defector. 
 
II. Factors Contributing to the Success of the Parties to 
the Nauru Agreement’s Vessel Day Scheme 
Agreement 
 
The development and implementation of the PNA’s Vessel 
Day Scheme should be considered successful. The parties created an 
agreement that was ratified by all parties and is in effect for all 
parties even though the agreement puts real constraints on all parties. 
Parties’ revenues from fishing license fees have increased 
significantly and are continuing to increase due to their ability to 
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agree to raise the minimum licensing fee.62 Parties are also achieving 
real progress in tuna conservation (at least within and between their 
own EEZs – this claim is complicated because of tuna’s expansive 
migration patterns), as fishing in a significant part of the fishable 
areas of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean has decreased to a 
level that, for now, the parties believe is sustainable. Considering 
that many international agreements fall through, are not ratified by 
important parties, do not achieve their goals in practice, do not 
beneficially affect the target resource because of loopholes or non-
compliance, or suffer from other crippling problems, the PNA’s 
experience seems unique.  
Surely, there are domestic characteristics that likely affected 
parties’ abilities to quickly and effectively construct and implement 
the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme. This Article does not address those 
factors. It instead focuses on international characteristics that led to 
the success of the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme.  
Factors that likely contribute to the success of the PNA’s 
Vessel Day Scheme agreement include the small number of parties 
that are involved in the negotiations, the similarities in the parties’ 
development and economic statuses, the like-mindedness of parties 
in terms of their interests and goals for the agreement, and the fact 
that these parties have worked as a coalition before in negotiating a 
tuna treaty with the United States. None of these factors alone could 
ensure the success of the Vessel Day Scheme. Rather, it is the 
combination of these factors, and likely other factors not identified 
here, that caused the PNA’s success. 
 
A. Small Number of Parties Involved 
 
Only eight parties were involved in the negotiations and 
outcomes of the Vessel Day Scheme agreement.63 Involving only a 
small number of participants simplifies the negotiation process as, 
theoretically, each party has a greater chance to voice concerns, have 
those concerns addressed by other parties, and participate equally in 
the negotiations.  
                                                
62 Deiye, supra note 1, at 2 (Figure 2). 
63 See Purse Seine Vessel Day Scheme, supra note 5, at Schedule 1 (listing the 
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Of course, even bilateral international negotiations sometimes 
do not come to fruition, despite the low number of parties. Thus, 
while the small number of parties was likely helpful in successfully 
ratifying and implementing the agreement, other factors necessarily 
contributed as well. 
 
B. Parties With Similar Development and Economic 
Statuses 
 
The PNA are similarly situated in their development status 
and relationship with the global market. As already mentioned, all 
the parties to the Nauru agreement are considered developing 
countries, and some are even listed as “Least Developed Countries” 
by the United Nations.64 None of them acting on their own are major 
international actors or have significant political sway. They are also 
similar in that they have small populations relative to other countries. 
All the PNA countries are influenced by their “small domestic 
market, remoteness from major markets, limited resource base, lack 
of a skilled and trained workforce, a narrow export base, heavy 
reliance on imports, poorly developed infrastructure and 
vulnerability to natural disasters.”65 
These similarities are important because they allow the  
parties to create an agreement with provisions that affect all involved 
countries equally. This prevents any one country from feeling 
disproportionately burdened by the action or funding required under 
the agreement.   
Compare this to negotiations between countries that differ 
greatly in their development status, place in the global market, 
population, and wealth. For example, the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change’s (“UNFCCC”) Kyoto Protocol 
included countries along the entire development spectrum. The 
Kyoto Protocol separated parties into Annex I parties, which 
included industrialized countries as identified under the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development and economies in 
                                                
64 List of Least Developed Countries, UNITED NATIONS,  
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/cdp/ldc/ldc_list.pdf 
(last visited Apr. 28, 2013) (including Kiribati, the Solomon Islands, and Tuvalu). 
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transition, and non-Annex I parties, which were considered 
developing countries, including countries with high greenhouse gas 
emissions, such as China and India.66 Only Annex I countries were 
assigned quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives. 
This created problems as some Annex I countries protested carrying 
the burden of emissions reductions while high-emission, non-Annex 
I countries like China and India continued to increase their 
greenhouse gas emissions. This example is limited, as the UNFCCC 
negotiations include almost every country in the world. A negotiation 
with this many parties, even if they were all of similar status and 
market profile, would likely be difficult as well. 
Another example stems from regional fisheries management 
organizations, which have fewer members than the UNFCCC, in 
particular the Western and Central Pacific Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks Commission (“WCPFC”), discussed earlier. The WCPFC 
includes Pacific Island countries, including all of the PNA, and 
distant water fishing nations such as the United States, China, the 
European Union, and Japan, totaling twenty-five members.67 The 
WCPFC requires consensus in its decision-making, and when the 
PNA brought their concerns about fishing on the high seas to the 
WCPFC, the diverse group of countries could not agree on high seas 
fishing regulations.68 The parties were likely unable to reach 
consensus because of a split between parties with diverging fishing 
capacities and profit incentives. This is another example of the 
difficulty in reaching agreement because of status, market, and other 
economic differences between involved parties, even when the 
negotiating group includes a small number of parties relative to the 
UNFCCC. 
Successfully creating and implementing an agreement that 
requires action, such as some sort of reduction or restriction, will be 
difficult when it involves parties with varying development and 
                                                
66 Parties and Observers, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
67 About WCPFC, W. & CENT. PAC. FISHERIES COMM’N,  
http://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
68 Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
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economic statuses and thus capacity to act. The countries that believe 
themselves to be carrying a disproportionate burden have incentive 
to object. Negotiating with countries of similar development and 
economic status will place a similar burden on all countries, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of “disproportionate burden” objections by 
one party.  
 
C. Similar Interests and Goals for Negotiations 
 
Negotiating with like-minded entities is easier than 
negotiating with entities that fundamentally disagree as to the 
problem (or whether there is a problem) and the goals of the 
negotiation.69 Because of the PNA’s similar statuses, discussed 
above, and similar dependence on their marine resources, particularly 
tuna, for subsistence use as well as economic gain, all eight parties 
entered into negotiations and agreements with similar management 
goals. These management goals were likely simplified due to the 
similarities in the parties’ geography, resources at stake, and interest 
in maximizing revenue from and continued existence of the resource 
at stake. 
Fishing license fees are a primary source of revenue for the 
PNA, and most of the PNA states are highly dependent on the 
revenue from the licensing fees.70 In most PNA countries, between 
twenty and fifty percent of each country’s GDP comes from 
licensing fees.71 Papua New Guinea is the least dependent on 
licensing fees (two percent GDP in 2000) because it is rich in non-
marine resources and has a significant mining and agricultural sector 
compared to the other PNA countries.72 Palau is also less dependent 
on fishing fees because of its significant tourism industry, but fishing 
fees still represent anywhere between four and thirty-four percent of 
the GDP for each of Palau’s sixteen states.73  
Most of the people of the PNA rely on the health of the 
fisheries around their islands for their subsistence lifestyle and 
                                                
69 Deiye, supra note 1, at 22. 
70 Id. at 1. 
71 Id. at 20. 
72 Id. at 20-21. 
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cannot afford for the fisheries to collapse. Thus, ensuring the 
continued existence of a healthy fishery around the islands is not just 
crucial for the revenue it brings to the PNA, but also for the food that 
PNA citizens rely on for survival. Many PNA countries do not have 
a significant agricultural sector other than subsistence fishing, and 
therefore must import much of their food. 
Additionally, the group’s expansive joint EEZs, cohesive 
voice, and management scheme give the PNA more negotiating 
power than the parties had individually. Generally, bilateral 
agreements between individual Pacific Island states and distant water 
fishing nations dilutes the negotiating strength of the Pacific Island 
region as a whole.74 The frustration of being mostly powerless, 
small, poor countries was part of the impetus to form the Southern 
Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency when the United States refused to 
recognize the Pacific Islands’ jurisdiction over tuna in the Magnuson 
Fishery Conservation and Management Act.75 The spillover effect of 
the Vessel Day Scheme in breaking the WCPFC stalemate over the 
management of fishing on the high seas reinforces how powerful 
small, developing countries can be when they organize and reach 
enforceable management agreements.  
The degradation of the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
tuna fishery is a major threat to the way of life for the parties. A 
legitimate management scheme not only protects the continued 
existence of the fisheries, but also increases the PNA’s power in 
international negotiations. Thus, the similar goals made the parties’ 
decision to enter negotiations relatively easier. 
 
D. Previous Cooperation for Other Agreements 
 
The PNA’s success with the Vessel Day Management 
Scheme has also been attributed to the Pacific Islands’ cooperation as 
a coalition in negotiating the Treaty on Fisheries Between the 
Governments of Certain Pacific Island States and the Government of 
the United States of America (“U.S. Treaty”) in 1987 and the 
renewals in 1993 and 2003.76 Until the U.S. Treaty, “the United 
                                                
74 Bostwick, supra note 24, at 910. 
75 Id. at 901. 
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States refused to acknowledge [n]either the island nations’ ownership 
claims over tuna found within their EEZs [n]or their right to charge 
access fees to fish for tuna caught within their EEZs.”77 The U.S. 
Treaty negotiations began after the United States instated embargoes 
in retaliation against Papua New Guinea for seizing a United States 
vessel that was fishing illegally.78 To solve the problem, the United 
States and sixteen Pacific Island states negotiated the U.S. Treaty, 
which secures licensing fees and fisheries-related technical 
assistance packages for the Pacific Island states.79 The Treaty is 
considered a successful treaty for the Pacific Island states and a 
model for other international agreements.80 Indeed, it is considered a 
major reason and model for the PNA’s success in working together 




The PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme serves as a rare example of a 
successful international agreement. The parties continue to realize 
increased power in international negotiations and revenue growth 
from their valuable marine resources. They are implementing a 
management system to ensure the longevity and health of their tuna 
stocks to serve subsistence and economic purposes. The small 
number of parties involved, the parties’ socio-economic similarities, 
the convergence of interests and united goals of the agreement, and 
the fact that these parties have previously worked as a coalition in 
negotiating the U.S. Treaty are all factors that contribute to the 
success of the PNA’s Vessel Day Scheme agreement.  
Additional primary sources are necessary to (1) conclude that 
these factors indeed contributed to the original and continuing 
success of the Vessel Day Scheme, (2) incorporate additional factors 
that played a role in the Scheme’s success, and (3) address the other 
questions posed in this Article. However, the conclusions drawn in 
                                                
77 Bostwick, supra note 24, at 911. 
78 Id. 
79 Id.; US Multilateral Treaty, PAC. ISLANDS F. FISHERIES AGENCY, 
 http://www.ffa.int/taxonomy/term/441 (last visited Apr. 14, 2014). 
80 Bostwick, supra note 24, at 912. 
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this Article are relevant starting points to further exploring these 
inquiries that may shed light on how other groups of small, 
developing countries can join together to solve collective action 
problems, increase their international negotiating power, and protect 
natural resources on which they depend.  
 
